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Wheat and Tares: Responding to
Vande Kemp and other Revisionists
JAMES D. FOSTER
George Fox College
Newberg, Oregon
MARK F. LEDBffiER
Western Conservative Baptist Seminary
Portland. Oregon
In her reaction, Hendrika Vande Kemp ( 1987) joins other critics of psychology in arguing
for a new psychology. The authors believe, however, that psychology developed as a science
because it was productive and that more subjective methods will gain respectability only
through similar productivity. In her critique, Vande Kemp creates a circular argument by
suggesting that the authors' position Jacks a proper historicaVphilosophical perspective, and
she underestimates the sophistication of those with whom she disagrees. Finally, the authors
disagree that there is no point in arguing with the most conservative anti-psychologists, since
they may be having a disproportionate influence on public perceptions of psychology.

Hendrika Vande Kemp's ( 1987) response
to our article on Christian anti-psychology is
reminiscent of Christ's parable of the wheat
and the tares (Matthew 13:24-30). Failing to
consider the consequences of their actions, the
servants in haste would have destroyed the
entire wheat harvest in order to eliminate the
tares. Vande Kemp's desire to weed psychology of its scientific roots places her in the
camp of those who would remake psychology
in their own image and rob psychology of a
methodology which has provided a rich
harvest for the last century. In Vande Kemp's
case, it is an image of psychology reunited
with philosophy. Vande Kemp writes that
"contemporary psychologists would generate
much more meaningful research if they were
not afraid to align themselves with 'the old
psychology' which was undifferentiated from
philosophy" (p. xx). This is reminiscent of the
arguments of Van Leeuwen (1982), who
Requests for reprints should be sent to James D.
Foster, PhD, Department of Psychology, George Fox
College, Newberg, Oregon 97132.

would reshape psychology by humanizing it.
She too believes that a born-again psychology
would be more productive. But in what way
was the old philosophical psychology more
productive? Many of the concerns we expressed about a humanized psychology (i.e.,
uncontrolled error and deception) might also
apply to a philosophized psychology. Ultimately, any suggested improvement in psychology must be judged by its productivity in
terms of theory or research. In this respect, the
humanizers of science, like Van Leeuwen and
Farnsworth (1985), would seem to have a
stronger position than Vande Kemp in that
they can point to research produced through
phenomenological methods.
Vande Kemp misreads our argument
when she concludes that we assume only one
path to knowledge is applicable to science.
Our epistemology would appear less "simplistic" if she would note that our position is that
"psychology ... emphasizes [italics added]
observation, measurement, and experimentation" and that "logic and reason" are a
valuable part of the process (Foster &
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Ledbetter, 1987, p. 11 ). We further conceded distinction between motor and ·sensory time, which
that "the picture of psychology as a completely Wundt and his followers consider the proper one. In other
words, only certain cases prove their result, and these
objective, carefully reasoned, experimental cases are selected because they prove that result
science has been successfully questioned ... " (Baldwin, p. 265)
(p. 14). Regardless of Vande Kemps's conAt times it appears that Vande Kemp is
tention that all sources of knowledge apply to
arguing that not ·accepting her historicaV
science, our point here is that the emphasis on
philosophical perspective on terms and
requirements of observation and experimenconcepts leads to faulty thinking regarding
tation have been successful in creating a
psychology, thus creating a similar argumenproductive discipline. Other disciplines find
tum in circulo. And if we find ourselves in
different emphases productive and we have no
disagreement with Vande Kemp we supposedly
more desire to reshape those disciplines than
have inadequate understanding. How will we
we have to reshape ours.
know when our thinking and understanding
Vande Kemp ( 1987) spends part of her
become correct? When we accept her hispaper expressing discontent with our use of
toricaVphilosophical perspective on the discertain terms. For example, she described our
puted terms and concepts!
defmition of empiricism as" extremely narrow"
Even if those who differ in view from
(p. 21), and suggested we erroneously defined
Vande Kemp (1987) would overcome their
common sense as a source of knowledge and
"naivete concerning matters philosophical"
that we carelessly used the concept of intuition
(p. 19) it would seem unlikely that all conflicts
(p. 21). We could argue that our definition of
would magically disappear. Vande Kemp
empiricism was specific and not narrow, that
appears to underestimate the sophistication of
Kilpatrick (1983) does argue for common
those who oppose her views. This can be seen
sense as a source of knowledge, and that if we
in her implied hierarchy of intellectual
had used the concept of intuition in a more
limited fashion then we would have been sophistication. Conservative anti-psychologists
subject to the criticism Vande Kemp leveled at are classed as the least sophisticated observers,
our use of the term "empiricism." But instead humanizers such as Van Leeuwen ( 1982) and
it might be more instructive to note that Evans ( 1982) as "more sophisticated observers"
conflicts such as these over semantic hygiene (p. 25), and those who think as she does are
often make up responses and responses to the most sophisticated. Surely there are
responses. These are often reminiscent of a sophisticated observers representing a variety
controversy between Edward Titchener and of positions on the issues involved.
Our approach to understanding the conflict
James Mark Baldwin in the early days of
between
psychology and anti-psychologists
psychology (Hothersall, 1984). Wundt had
~as to loo~ at different ways of knowing
reported a consistent difference in reaction
times between motor and sensory responses to mstead of d1fferent levels of sophistication. In
a stimulus. Based on his research Baldwin so doing we tried to avoid the danger of failing
to respect the competence of those advocating
concluded that no such difference exists and
that indeed if such a difference existed it was in alternative positions (admittedly this is not
the opposite direction. Titchener accepted easy to do). For example, in his book The
Wundt's finding and accused Baldwin of Battle for the Mind, Tim LaHaye (1980)
sloppy methodology. In response, Baldwin makes such an error when he identifies the
hum.~ist obsessions to be sex, pornography,
(1895) wrote:
m.anJuana, drugs, self-indulgence, rights
The attempt to rule these results out on the ground of
w1thout responsibilities, and disillusionment
incompetency in the reagents(subjects) is in my opinion a
with America (p. 136). We suspect that
flagrant argumentum in circulo. Their contention is that a
LaHaye would be hard pressed to fmd
certain Anlage or aptitude is necessary in or to experihumanists who would agree with this characmentation on reaction times. And when we ask what the
terization. We also doubt whether Van
Anlage is, we are told that the only indication of it is the
ability of the reagent to turn out reactions which give the
Leeuwen ( 1982), Evans ( 1982), or the
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conservative anti-psychologists consider themselves less sophisticated observers than Vande
Kemp.
Van de Kemp is correct when she assumes
we believe modern science is superior to its
historical predecessors if by this she means it
gives insights in a way that foiT?er ~~proaches
could not While we agree that mtuttion has an
important role in science, we believe remakers
of psychology, such as Vande Kemp and Van
Leeuwen (1982), open the door to subjective
sources of data uncomfortably wide. At best it
would become more difficult to establish a
verifiable reality and at worst it becomes
untenable to exclude hallucinations, delusions,
and other subjective phenomenon as data.
Vande Kemp's (1987) and O'Donnell's
(1979) suggestion that Boring (1950) ~ight
have used his history of psychology text m an
attempt to shape its destiny and cut it off from
its historical roots is not persuasive for two
reasons. First, it is no more reasonable to
assume that Boring's history text shaped the
thinking of psychologists than it is to assume
that the text was used because it reflected the
thinking of those teaching the history of
psychology. Second, the argument that Boring
distorted his history to favor experimental
psychology in an attempt to persuade is not
particularly compelling since he clearly states
his intentions and narrowed perspective. For
example, Vande Kemp writes "Boring's
philosophy of positivism and bias for experimentation [italics added) were apparent in his
assessment of our history" (p. 22). This
shouldn't be too surprising in a book titled A
History of Experimental Psychology. In his
preface to the first edition of his book Boring
( 1950) further clarifies the limits of his
history.
Naturally the words "experimental psychology" must
mean, in my title, what they meant to Wundt and what
they meant to nearly all psychologists for fifty or sixty
years-that is to say, the psychology of the generalized,
human, normal, adult mind as revealed in the psychological laboratory. In making this choice I have had no
doctrinaire's thesis to defend. Animal psychology is of the
laboratory; the mental tests are in a way experimental;
abnormal psychology may be experimental. The first two
of these subjects I have brought into my exposition in so
far as their development was interpenetrated with the
growth of "experimental psychology;" but I do not, of

course, pretend to have written an adequate history of
either movement. (p. x)

Boring clearly stated his intention to trace
the history of experimental psychology as he
defined it Critiquing Boring for ignoring the
applied elements of psychology, as O'Donnell
(1979) does, or arguing as Vande Kemp that
this view of history "especially influenced the
older generation of contemporary psychologists" (p. 24) seems unfounded in light of
Boring's opening statement of his intentions.
Could it be instead that psychology evolved as
an experimental science not because of a
conspiracy to shape it that way, or because of
the historical circumstances (i.e., the depression; O'Donnell, 1979) but because its
scientific methodology proved tci be the most
productive approach? It may be revisionists'
interpretations of history tell us more about
the writer and the age in which they write than
about history.
We agree with Vande Kemp's (1987)
contention that the "most conservative of the
anti-psychologists who reject all sources of
knowledge other than authority" would find
no form of psychology acceptable (p. 20). We
disagree, however, that "there is little point in
presenting an argument" (p. 20). ~he co~ser
vative anti-psychologists have been mcreasmgly
vocal in their opposition to psychology and
may be having a disproportionate influence on
people's attitudes toward psychology. We are
particularly concerned with the growing
number of anti-psychology books and the
effect they may have on the public's view of
psychology.
.
Paul Vitz (1977) published the antipsychology book Psychology as Religion:
The Cult of Self Worship, selling nearly
46,000 copies. Martin and Deidre Bobgan
( 1979) published another critique, The
Psychological Way/The Spiritual Way, and
sold 17,000 copies. William Kirk Kilpatrick
(1983) sold 47,000 copies of his Psychological Seduction and Hunt and McMahon
(1985) have sold 410,000 copies of The
Seduction ofChristianity. Kilpatrick's critique
of psychology appeared not only in book form
but also in published interviews (Thorn, 1986)
and articles (Kilpatrick, 1986). These books
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and articles mix legitimate concerns with
extremist views and often attack psychology's
fringe (i.e., fad therapies). In these attacks,
psychology critics are impacting psychology
by discouraging those who may need the help
of a professional Christian psychologist
Dr. Vande Kemp (1987) also suggests
that psychology and religion are really
addressing different questions; To a certain
degree this is true. Nevertheless there are large
areas of overlap between the two fields. We
are inclined to agree with Gary Collins ( 1981)
when he suggests that psychology and theology
have" similar interests and overlapping goals"
(p. 15). Psychologists and theologians both
deal with "human behavior, values, interpersonal relations, attitudes, beliefs, pathology, marriage, the family, helping, and
problem areas such as loneliness, discouragement, grief and anxiety" (Collins, p. 15).
This overlap in perceived responsibility leads
to competition and may be another root of the
conflict between Christian anti-psychologists
and psychology.
When Vande Kemp, Van Leeuwen and
other critics look at the field of psychology
they see an unproductive discipline apprenticed to a stilted methodology and in desperate
need of change. When we look at the discipline,
however, we see an exciting, productive field
rich with theory, research, and application.
We are not particularly concerned when
scholars such as these criticize the field of
psychology since these well thought-out
critiques serve to force mainstream psychology
into reexamination and self-evalutation,
particularly when the discussions are carried
out in journals such as this. We are much more
concerned with Christian anti-psychologists,
however, who are carrying out their attacks in
the public forum, since these one-sided attacks
are likely to be read by people who do not have
ready access to alternative points of view.
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